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Abstract. The three countries of the Benelux 
are often overlooked in Europe’s current un-
conventional gas debate. But the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Luxembourg all possess consid-
erable shale gas resources, and major energy 
companies have already taken an interest. So 
far no serious drilling has taken place. This 
article puts the discoveries and recent action 
in the perspective of regional breakdown of 
public policy and government authority. Ana-
lyzing business prospects, economic policy and 
regulatory action of the different governments 
in the Benelux, the article yields insight into 
the relevant power structure inside the policy 
domain. The influence of different members of 
the Benelux on the other members is discussed. 
All three countries have adopted a rather 
cautious attitude towards the exploration and 
production of unconventional gas.  
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Introduction 
The “Benelux” is, contrary to popular European usage of the 
term, not just a handy acronym for a geographic and cultural 
group of three countries within the EU. It is a true formal union 
of states, complete with executive, legislative and judiciary in-
stitutions and a long history of intergovernmental cooperation. 
The union goes back to a 1944 customs agreement and the 1958 
treaty which established the Benelux Economic Union. In 2008, 
the treaty was renewed and the name shortened to Benelux Un-
ion. As the original name implies, economic cooperation is at the 
heart of the Benelux. Thus, the development of unconventional 
gas resources should be a matter of this union. 
However, analyzing policy on unconventional gas on a Bene-
lux level is not an easy thing to do. The Benelux Economic Un-
ion has an administration (the Secretariat-General in Brussels) 
and a parliamentary assembly. The parliament not possess any 
specific powers within the energy policy area and specifically, 
the unconventional gas issue. It does not engage in lawmaking 
but has a role in information exchange among parliaments of the 
member states, and advises member states on international eco-
nomic cooperation. 
Strictly taking to the constitutional organization of the Benelux 
member states, at least ten involved governments can be identi-
fied, eight of which are part of the complex political landscape of 
Belgium:  
 the Cabinet of the Netherlands, representing the Dutch citi-
zens in all matters,  
 the Council of the Government of Luxembourg, representing 
the citizens of Luxembourg in all matters, 
  the Federal Government Council of Belgium, representing 
the citizens of Belgium in certain environmental and energy-
related matters,  
 the Flemish Community of Belgium, representing the Dutch 
speaking citizens of Belgium in social matters, 
 the Flemish Region of Belgium, representing Flemish citi-
zens in economic and environmental matters, 
 the Walloon Region of Belgium, representing the Walloon 
citizens in economic and environmental matters,  
 the Wallonia-Brussels Federation of Belgium, representing 
the French speaking citizens of Belgium in social matters,  
 the German-speaking Community of Belgium, representing 
the German speaking citizens of Belgium in social matters,  
 the Brussels-Capital Region of Belgium, representing the 
Brussels citizen in economic and environmental matters.  
In addition, the provinces of both Belgium and the Netherlands 
have specific executive powers within the environmental policy 
domain, but they are considered to not be of high importance for 
legislative decisions. The state organization of the Kingdom of 
Belgium is changing. From July 2014, the Communities and 
Regions will obtain extra powers in environmental and energy 
policy.  
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Via analyzing recent news coverage from both local and inter-
national press, policy makers’ speech and scientific articles, this 
article focuses on the main responsible governments within the 
policy domain of unconventional gas. The first main section 
draws a basic sketch of those stakeholders, highlighting their 
history, future prospects, public policy actions, and business-
government relations in relation to unconventional gas. A shorter 
second section specifically focuses on recent intergovernmental 
developments and actions between Flanders and the Netherlands, 
the two Dutch-speaking members of the Benelux area. 
The Netherlands  
The Netherlands have a long history in drilling for convention-
al gas. Today, they are the largest EU gas producer and exporter: 
“Although they have passed the point of peak gas production and 
our gas reserves are diminishing, the Netherlands can maintain 
its current position until around 2025” (Government of the 
Netherlands, 2013). But as its conventional gas reserves from the 
large Groningen gas fields are shrinking, the Netherlands are 
looking for a replacement. Gas revenues yield €15 billion a year 
currently; 42 percent of the nation’s energy comes from natural 
gas, which is an exceptionally high share in Europe (Steinglass, 
2013). Gas as an energy source is not uncontroversial. Since 
1986, multiple earthquakes have occurred in the Netherlands 
because of the extraction of gas, resulting in much critical debate 
and public opinion being rather pessimistic about further extrac-
tion of gas in the Netherlands (Heylen, 2013). 
Currently, conventional gas extraction is mainly operated by 
the Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij, co-owned by Royal 
Dutch Shell and ExxonMobil. This company does have the tech-
nology and know-how available to extract shale gas in the Neth-
erlands. One NAM executive has clearly stated: “We have built 
up years of experience in extracting gas within the Netherlands, 
and we used fracking to extract some of our conventional gas 
fields, so we can and should definitely explore this now” 
(Windhorst, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 1: Principal shale gas basins in Western Europe (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 2011). 
 
Gasunie, the Dutch state-owned gas distribution company, has 
been developing an important network for the transportation of 
gas in Europe. The company built its reputation on the transpor-
tation of Dutch conventional gas, and is definitely looking for 
new ways to keep its reliability high in the future. In Bergermeer, 
Gasunie is currently realizing a gas storage facility via its subsid-
iary Gas Transport Systems. After some lobbying, Gazprom also 
became a shareholder in this project, with a capacity of two 
billion cubic metres per year (Medvedev, 2013), which is ap-
proximately 42 percent of the total capacity of the storage facili-
ty. But the Dutch government is not really keen on further coop-
eration with Gazprom after severe incidents on the extraction of 
gas between the company and Royal Dutch Shell during the 
Sakhalin II-project in the Russian Arctic. A Gasunie manager 
stated, “shale gas is a very interesting opportunity for Gasunie 
and the Netherlands to keep its independence and reliability on 
the transportation of gas in the future” (Verberg, 2013). 
The reserves of shale gas in the Netherlands are estimated be-
tween circa 200 and 500 billion cubic metres (Zijp, 2012). The 
map of figure 1 shows the area where unconventional gas can be 
found in the Netherlands. 
Quite a lot of the possible extraction territories within the 
Netherlands have been given as concessions to a company. At 
present, the Dutch public authorities have provided a company, 
Brabant Resources BV, a license to start test drilling for shale gas 
in Boxtel in the Flevoland province, one of the most promising 
areas to extract shale gas in the future. The company, which is 
minority state-owned (40 percent of the shares of Brabant Re-
sources BV are owned by the state-controlled EBN BV, which 
also invests in other unconventional gas projects in Northern 
Europe). This company is the only one so far who has really 
wanted to start exploring shale gas; but its license has been sus-
pended in March 2012 because of strong opposition from both 
citizens and local public authorities. “Public support is very 
important to realize this project, and at present, there is no public 
support”, argued activist Stijn De Klerk (2012), member of the 
action committee “Shale-free Boxtel.”  
Boxtel is not the only place where communities have voiced 
strong opposition and local authorities have announced they 
would deny well permits. The Netherlands are known for a very 
active scene of environmental groups, and their arguments that 
the Dutch have location-specific problems because of high popu-
lation density, complex infrastructure and too permeated with 
water convinced many locals to be cautious about “fracking.” A 
spring 2013 public opinion survey by polling firm Maurice de 
Hond showed 44 percent against and 35 percent in favor of de-
veloping shale gas (Steinglass, 2013). “Opponents are winning 
the Dutch shale gas war,” declared a newspaper in April 2013: 
Support for extracting shale gas from under the Netherlands is fad-
ing and an increasing number of local councils are taking a stand 
[…]. So far, 33 of the country’s 400 local authority areas have de-
clared they are opposed to shale gas extraction […]. Some 170 
councils are thought to be sitting on shale or coal gas reserves. The 
Netherlands’ shale gas reserves could run into billions of euros but 
it is unclear if the gas will ever be extracted because of the well-
organised opposition […]. [However, the] national government can 
still overturn local council objections and press ahead with shale 
gas extraction. (DutchNews.nl, 2013). 
As a result of this fierce conflict, industry now faces a morato-
rium on all licenses for shale gas in all of the Netherlands. It 
should be noted that the Dutch political culture is very orientated 
toward consensus building, and public support across a range of 
stakeholders in society has high priority for government action. 
Foreign companies and investors in the Dutch economy, too, 
have to adjust to this slow-moving, step-by-step process. Rush 
decisions are rare.  
Five main players are operating in the Netherlands: NAM, 
NPN, Brabant, Vermilion, and Hardenburg. As Table 1 shows, 
British firms have a major influence in the Dutch unconventional 
gas business. Geographic proximity and experience on the home 
market makes the UK without any doubt the most important 
acting country on the Dutch unconventional gas market. The 
Dutch people themselves only have minor claims on the Dutch 
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unconventional gas resources: the Dutch state directly controls 
40 percent of Brabant Resources BV, and indirectly the Dutch 
dynasty, since “the Dutch Royal Family is still reputed to be the 
single largest shareholder of Royal Dutch Shell, […], via owning 
between 5 and 25 percent of the shares” (Queen Wilhelmina 
State Park, 2012). This situation could make it harder for public 
opinion to accept extraction of unconventional gas, as the citi-
zens do not see a direct advantage by gaining extra revenues for 
the Dutch government (aside from taxing the foreign firms). As 
the Netherlands is still self-sufficient in conventional gas, the 
country does not directly have to fear high market prices for 
imports. In case of emergency, the government could even de-
cide to regulate gas prices down for the current market players. 
 
Full name Owned by Share Country of Origin 
Nederlandse  
Aardolie Maat-
schappij BV 
(NAM) 
Royal Dutch 
Shell Plc 50% 
NL 
UK 
Exxon Mobil 
Corp. 50% USA 
Northern Petro-
leum Nederland 
BV (NPN) 
Northern  
Petroleum Plc 100% UK 
Brabant  
Resources BV 
(BR) 
Dutch  
Government 40% NL 
Cuadrilla  
Resources Ltd 60% UK 
Vermilion Oil & 
Gas Netherlands 
BV (VERM) 
Vermilion  
Energy Inc. 100% Canada 
Hardenburg 
Resources BV 
(CUA) 
Cuadrilla  
Resources Ltd 100% UK 
 
Table 1: List of companies with licenses for the exploration and 
production of unconventional gas in the Netherlands, 2012. 
Based on ‘Licenses in the Netherlands, April 2012’ (Netherlands 
Organisation for Applied Scientific Research TNO, 2012), and 
information retrieved from the Dutch Chamber of Commerce. 
 
Speaking about the royal family of the Netherlands, King Wil-
lem-Alexander der Nederlanden, who stepped to the throne in 
April 2013, may have a special role in the country’s direction. As 
former president of the United Nations Secretary-General's Advi-
sory Board on Water and Sanitation (UNSGAB), it is clear that 
the king has a particular interest in water-related issues. Due to 
the fact that King Willem-Alexander is a de facto member of the 
Dutch government, his opinion on water-related topics, like the 
extraction of unconventional gas, will be taken into account 
when taking political decisions in the Netherlands. As his mother 
Beatrix before him, he will be talking to cabinet members and the 
prime minister on a regular basis (Te Velde, 2013). On the un-
conventional gas issue, the king may face a serious conflict of 
interest: on the one hand, his work in favor of clean water supply 
suggests a stand critical of “fracking” methods, but he has a 
vested interest in one major unconventional gas developer, Royal 
Dutch Shell. It will be seen how the king positions himself. 
Oil and gas companies are of course not the only stakeholders 
in the debate. Some major players of the Dutch economy, from 
breweries to banks, have chosen to take a stand. Like in Germa-
ny, the country’s brewers are a formidable lobby and an im-
portant industry with considerable influence on media and public 
opinion. Major companies like Heineken, Grolsch, and Bavaria 
are member of the brewers’ union, which has taken a critical 
position, fearing for the quality of their products’ main ingredient 
– water. In April 2013, the Union of Dutch Brewers announced: 
[The] extraction of shale gas and other activities within the soil 
should not have an effect on the ground water. As long as that is not 
proven, we are very concerned about the extraction of shale gas 
(Marijnissen, 2013).  
The biggest banking and financial services company of the 
Netherlands, Rabobank (Coöperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boe-
renleenbank B.A.), has also expressed its concerns on the explo-
ration and production of unconventional gas in the Netherlands.  
It even moved to use its power position to influence the debate 
on shale gas. In July 2013, a Rabobank spokesman said on TV:  
The bank does not lend money to companies that have something to 
do with the extraction of shale gas. Farmers who rent their land to 
extract shale gas from the soil do not get any further loans from us 
(NOS, 2013).  
These public statements came while the Dutch government 
was waiting for the outcome of a major study by the Technical 
University of Delft, which was intended to become a basis for 
decisions on the future of the moratorium. This study should 
have been published by end of 2012, but was only been passed to 
the Dutch government by mid-2013. The Dutch Commission of 
Environmental Impact Assessment received this study, but de-
clared that “answers on serious issues related to drinking water 
supply and the interests of local residents are missing” (Postma, 
2013). The current cabinet of Prime Minister Mark Rutte, a 
coalition of the conservative-liberal People's Party for Freedom 
and Democracy (VVD) and the social democratic Labor Party 
(PvDA), has internal conflicts about energy policy. Generally, 
“the conservative-liberal fraction is not happy with the anti-
unconventional gas position of its government partner” (Simons, 
2013). The social democratic party stated that “the extraction of 
shale gas will not have a fundamental positive impact on the 
energy economy in the Netherlands, because shale gas reserves 
are much lower than conventional gas reserves” (Simons, 2013).  
By the end of the summer, a government-commissioned report 
by a consulting consortium suggested that shale gas drilling 
could be done safely and with minimal ecological impact. One 
key argument was that Dutch shale gas reserves lie deep, much 
deeper than in the U.S. for example. Economic affairs minister 
Henk Kamp (VVD) responded to the report, “if shale gas can be 
exploited in a responsible fashion in the Netherlands, and if we 
have it in economically interesting quantities, then we should 
seriously consider doing so” (Steinglass, 2013). 
But the results of the various studies did not convince the La-
bor Party, which had voted against “fracking” in a spring 2013 
party congress. So the Dutch coalition government could only 
agree to delay its decision. Licensed companies cannot proceed, 
and new applications will not be administered. The government 
announced that it would take 18 months for further study on the 
potential effects of hydraulic fracturing on the environment in all 
potential drilling sites. Minister Kamp also said he wanted more 
input from local governments, and would examine how local 
governments could “wield more influence in establishing condi-
tions under which licenses for the exploration and possible drill-
ing would be issued” (UPI, 2013).  
Belgium 
Federal government  
The Belgian situation for developing policy on unconventional 
gas situation is very special. Responsibility is dispersed among 
different communities, regions and the federal government. 
Different political parties govern on different levels. The Belgian 
federal states have diverging economic situations, and different 
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opportunities for the exploration of shale gas exist. Moreover, as 
mentioned above, the Belgian government system is undergoing 
reform, shifting policymaking powers to lower levels, i.e. com-
munities and regions. 
At present, the most important policy domain on the federal 
level of Belgium which can influence the unconventional gas 
debate, is energy policy. There are some environment-related 
powers that are currently held by the federal government, but the 
center of gravity lays with the states. At the moment, the State 
Secretary for Environment, Energy and Mobility, Melchior 
Whatelet (Humanist Democratic Centre, French-speaking), is 
administering both policy domains on the federal level. In Febru-
ary 2013, the liberal group within the federal parliament asked 
Whatelet to his opinion on shale gas, and he answered:  
I don’t say yes, but I don’t say no either to the extraction of shale 
gas. […] I am closely following international studies on the topic. If 
we find out that there are possibilities for shale gas extraction, we 
would need to examine the question, taking into account both eco-
nomic potential and potential environmental consequences (De 
Becker, 2013).  
As the two main regions of Belgium, Flanders and Wallonia, 
have a completely separated public opinion context – basically 
because of a different language and separated media landscape – 
and different opportunities to produce unconventional gas, this 
article speaks in more detail about the different communities and 
regions involved in the unconventional gas debate in Belgium. 
From a constitutional point of view, the states have their own 
right to decide in favor or against unconventional gas. 
Flemish Community and Flemish Region  
Strictly spoken, Flanders consists of both a Flemish Communi-
ty (responsible for social matters), and a Flemish Region (re-
sponsible for environmental and economic matters). But the 
Flemish Community and Region merged several years ago. 
There is thus only one parliament elected for Flanders. In Flan-
ders, two different types of unconventional gas are available. 
There are possibilities to extract both coalbed methane and shale 
gas. Coalbed methane can be found in the old abandoned mines 
in Limburg, and hydraulic fracturing is not needed to extract the 
gas. According to a survey conducted by VITO [Flemish Institute 
for Technological Research], at least 7.7 billion cubic metres 
recoverable methane gas can be extracted in the Campine Basin: 
“That seems a lot, but it is less than half of the annual natural gas 
consumption in Belgium” (Grietens, 2013).  
NV Mijnen, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Limburgse Recon-
versie Maatschappij, has obtained approximately 80 percent of 
all coalfield concessions in Flanders (Dart Energy Limited, 
2011). This company set up a joint venture with Australia’s Dart 
Energy, called NV Limburg Gas, with 20 percent of the shares in 
the hands of Dart Energy. The company has applied for a license 
to start research for coalbed methane in the Limburg area in 
April 2013 from the Flemish Ministry of Environment. In the 
next two years, NV Limburg Gas has the opportunity to conduct 
detailed studies. After this phase, the company will have to ask 
for extra permits before real drilling can start: an environmental 
impact report needs to be delivered, an environmental permit and 
a building permit must be applied for (Vandenhove, 2013). 
Otherwise, there seem to be no ongoing studies in the Limburg 
area. According to one report, Catholic University of Leuven has 
asked Royal Dutch Shell for €100,000 support to investigate 
unconventional gas layers in Limburg, but Shell found it too 
expensive (Thuwis, 2013). Another study was offered but not 
implemented by CWC Group, which represents Shell, Total and 
ExxonMobil (Van Horenbeek, 2013). As regarding permits, by 
April 2013 five companies had asked for administrative infor-
mation on necessary permits to extract unconventional gas in 
Flanders, but none laid a concrete application on the table 
(Vanaudenhove, 2013). Although possibilities to extract coalbed 
methane in the Limburg area exist, the unconventional gas run in 
Flanders is not as advanced as in the Netherlands. 
One aspect which drives the debate are energy prices. Current-
ly, Belgian energy consumer pay very high prices compared to 
neighboring countries, the Belgian Commission for the Regula-
tion of Electricity and Gas (2012) has concluded. The Flemish 
government is concerned about the competitive position of the 
Flanders economy, and specifically the position of the chemical 
sector near the Port of Antwerp, which would profit from lower 
energy costs.  
Other economic aspects pertain to recent job losses and busi-
ness instability. The region where most gas would be extracted, 
Limburg, is currently suffering from the economic and financial 
crisis. For example, car manufacturer Ford recently decided to 
close its factory in Genk in 2014, a hard blow for the region. If 
the economic situation does not improve in the mid-term, the 
Flemish government would have a strong incentive to pursue 
new opportunities. But at the moment, the government seems not 
keen on making it easy for companies willing to drill. It has 
decided to postpone a decision until a report on the chances of 
unconventional gas in Flanders and the environmental effects of 
“fracking” has been delivered by NV Limburg Gas. Flemish 
Prime Minister Kris Peeters has stated that the government is not 
about to rush:  
We will take our time to form our opinion on shale gas. It is clear 
that the industry in the United States of America has grown very 
fast because of cheaper energy. But in Europe, the sensitivity of the 
population to environmental cases is a lot higher (De Roo, 2013). 
Several interest groups, such as Vlaams Netwerk van Onder-
nemingen, the Flemish Chamber of Commerce, and Bond Beter 
Leefmilieu, the main Flemish group for a better environment, 
have presented their position on the issue, but so far an extensive 
public debate has not taken place in Flanders. 
Walloon Region  
At present, there are no reliable studies that confirm that Wal-
lonia has shale gas available in its soil. There is some evidence 
that the Walloon mining areas also contain coalbed methane, but 
there is little data and understanding of the geology, much less 
certainty about the volume of technically recoverable gas 
(Cornet, 2013). According to researchers at Mons University, the 
total amount of coalbed methane available for extraction is be-
tween 100 and 300 billion cubic metres, which is significantly 
more than the quantity in Flanders. “[The Walloon reserves] can 
provide Belgium with gas for approximately 10 years. That is a 
significant quantity, but it is not a gold mine for Wallonia,” it is 
reported (Radio et Television de la Belgique francophone, 2013). 
The most interested partners to extract gas in Wallonia are 
Royal Dutch Shell and Albert Frère. Several newspapers state 
that Shell is rumored to have started a research project in Wal-
lonia. The projects of Albert Frère, the richest citizen of Bel-
gium, do have visible traces. In 2008, his first ideas were 
launched to extract coalbed methane, and some consultancy 
activities took place via Transcore Astra SA, a subsidiary of one 
of his holdings called CPN.  Transcore Astra, nowadays known 
as one of the specialists in the extraction of coalbed methane, has 
obtained two licenses on the mine gas in Charleroi from Gaznor 
SA, and is now exploring the potential (Le Soir, 2013). Moreo-
ver, the company is applying for a license to restart operating old 
gas tanks of Fluxys, the Belgian gas distributor, in Anderlues. 
This gives some focus for the unconventional gas debate in the 
region (Le Soir, 2013). As Frère is one of the most influential 
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businessmen of Belgium (he made his fortune taking over state-
owned companies), it is expected that he has realistic chances. 
Just like in Flanders, a broad public debate on unconventional 
gas has not yet taken place, which could also help Albert Frère to 
get his licenses and permits quickly. 
Other regions  
Neither the Walloon nor the Brussels-Capital Region nor the 
German-speaking community have shale gas reserves. The only 
unconventional gas available is coalbed methane in the Liege 
area. As a vast majority of votes within the Wallonia-Brussels 
Federation are held by politicians from Wallonia, and because of 
Brussels’ low interest, the influence of Brussels in public debates 
would be low. Future decisions taken by the Walloon Region are 
likely to be supported by the Wallonia-Brussels Federation. 
Luxembourg  
In Luxembourg, a debate on unconventional gas has already 
taking place. In November 2012, the government decided to 
forbid extraction of unconventional gas using “fracking” meth-
ods, due to possible environmental impacts. The reason was that 
shale gas found in Bettembourg and Pétange, it was reported 
from studies, was too close to the surface and in a too densely 
populated area (Wort, 2012). It is thus technologically impossible 
to extract shale gas in Luxemburg. Different methods would have 
to be developed in order to make shale gas in Luxemburg ex-
tractable. Only then  would the Luxembourg government recon-
sider (Wort, 2012).  
According to a study dating back to 1993, Luxembourgian soil 
contains approximately 100 billion cubic metres of shale gas. 
“That is enough to quench the national energy needs for 20 to 30 
years,” said the social democratic member of the European Par-
liament, Robert Goebbels, an outspoken former economic affairs 
and energy minister who has criticized his country’s “Denkver-
bot,” or ban on thinking, about exploring for shale gas. (2012). 
Interregional 
Benelux 
If we want to combine all of the above-mentioned regional po-
litical powers, we end up speaking about the Interparliamentary 
Benelux Consultative Council, better known as the Benelux 
Parliament, which was set up in 1955. Nicknamed “the testing 
ground for the European Union”, it “provides the governments 
with advice on economic and cross-frontier cooperation. Its 
recommendations may also concern other matters if common 
interests or current events so dictate (Benelux Parliament, 
2013)”. However, it is doubtful that this parliamentary institution 
is going to play any significant role in energy policy in the fu-
ture, as it is generally not viewed as a key player. A major issue 
within the Benelux Parliament is that it only meets three times 
per year. Introducing new policies here, certainly those where a 
lot of conflicting opinions and interests have to be managed, 
would take a lot of time. So far, its proceedings record basically 
no mention of unconventional gas.  
Dutch-Flemish cooperation 
A different picture emerges from more informal cross-border 
cooperation. In summer 2013, the Flemish and Dutch govern-
ment teamed up for a trade mission to Texas. Usually, the federal 
government of Belgium organizes trade missions, but Flanders 
also has the authority to organize trade missions. During this 
high-profile journey, a delegation of some 90 business executives 
from both countries, led by Prime Ministers Mark Rutte and Kris 
Peeters, mostly visited the chemical industry in Texas. The Texas 
chemical firms and Texan ports, such as Houston, are important 
trade partners for the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam, which 
both are major players in the European chemical sector. 
In Texas, the Flemish and Dutch delegation visited the re-
search facilities of ExxonMobil. The topic of discussion was 
shale gas. The message of ExxonMobil was clear: “Because 
shale gas is allowed in the U.S., the chemical industry currently 
has a big lead on the European. If Flanders and the Netherlands 
continue to lure investors, steps must be put to improve competi-
tiveness” (VMMa, 2013).  
It seems that both Rutte and Peeters have understood this mes-
sage, as they afterwards said to plan a joint consultation on un-
conventional gas in the fall of 2013. The Flanders premier even 
indicated that the EU should change its view on shale gas. He 
said that “the message from ExxonMobil was not a threat but a 
warning” about competitiveness (VMMa, 2013).  His Dutch 
colleague, Prime Minister Rutte, responded: “We should make 
sure that the amount of regulation on the European level decreas-
es. Together [with Flanders], we will do everything possible to 
make this happen” (VTM Nieuws, 2013). 
Conclusion 
The different countries inside the Benelux area have a rather 
cautious attitude towards unconventional gas. They and their 
regions are in different stages of advancement in the policy 
domain, but at present no real drilling for unconventional gas has 
taken place.  
Where we see a federal Belgium that is not really interested in 
the unconventional gas debate, the Netherlands, driven by do-
mestic and foreign interests and at least half the government, are 
taking a leadership role within the Benelux. The Netherlands 
have also seen the broadest and most intense debate of the three 
countries.  
Flanders has been rather skeptical about the extraction of shale 
gas, but at minimum has economic interests to protect connected 
to the port of Antwerp. Where we see Flanders skeptical about 
shale gas, the region takes a more positive position towards 
coalbed methane, because questionable and badly perceived 
fracking methods are not needed to extract the gas. But again, no 
permits or drilling has so far taken place.  
Despite the Luxembourgian moratorium on “fracking,” the 
government keeps the door open for alternative extraction meth-
ods, which at the moment are not available. In Wallonia, neither 
much debate nor policymaking can be tracked, but there is the 
intriguing activity of investor Albert Frère, which could put 
Wallonia on the map.  
Many questions remain unanswered at present, and the Bene-
lux seems to be in slow motion on unconventional gas. However, 
with the Dutch struggling forward and more likely progress in 
coalbed methane, the upcoming two years may see a lot more 
crucial discussion on shale– and perhaps a real push for action by 
investors.  
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